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Abstract
In face of the global food crisis of 2007–2008, severe concerns arose about how developing countries would be
aﬀected by the extreme short-term fluctuations in international commodity prices. We examine the eﬀects of the
crisis on Bolivia, one of the poorest countries of the Americas. We focus on the eﬀectiveness of the domestic policy
interventions in preventing spillovers of the development of international food prices to domestic markets. Using a
cointegration model, we study price interdependencies of wheat flour, sunflower oil and poultry. The analysis suggests
that the policy measures taken had little eﬀect on food security during the food crisis. Throughout the entire period,
perfect price transmission between the Bolivian poultry and sunflower oil markets and the respective international
reference markets existed. Bolivian prices were determined by international prices and the policy interventions in the
markets of these two commodities were not found to have had an eﬀect. The government’s large-scale wheat flour
imports did not shield Bolivian consumers from the shocks of international prices.
Keywords: agricultural trade policies, Bolivia, cointegration, error-correction, food crisis, food security, market
integration, price transmission
1 Introduction
The period between 2007 and 2009 was characterised
by strong fluctuations of international prices of agri-
cultural commodities, particularly those of grains and
oilseeds. From 2007 until the first half of 2008, world
market prices of these products soared in a never ex-
perienced way. Often referred to as the 2007–2008
food crisis (von Braun, 2008a), this period has re-
ceived substantial attention from the academic commu-
nity and triggered a number of concerns about the con-
sequences of extreme short-term increases and higher
volatility in international agricultural/food commodity
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prices (De Hoyos & Medvedev, 2011; Headey & Fan,
2008; Masters & Shively, 2008; Valero-Gil & Valero,
2008).
By presenting a case study of Bolivia, a land-locked
developing country located in the central part of South
America, the present article contributes to the debate
about these concerns. Due to its comparatively low de-
velopment status and its problematic food security situa-
tion, Bolivia deserves attention in the context of the food
price crisis: according to the Multidimensional Poverty
Index 2010, Bolivia in that year had the largest share
of poor people in the South American region (OPHI,
2010). In 2007, when measured at the national poverty
line, 60 percent of the population lived in poverty with
27 percent of the population suﬀering from undernour-
ishment (World Bank, 2011). For the Bolivian economy,
agriculture and livestock production are important activ-
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ities, contributing a share of 9.7 percent to the annual to-
tal gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008. When adding
the contribution of the food/feedmanufacturing industry
in Bolivia, which also comprises the oilseed and sugar
cane processing industry, this share rises to 14.6 percent
(INE, 2009b). Bolivia’s agricultural sector comprises
three major geographical blocks, each of them charac-
terized by its own production system: the western high
plateau, the tropical eastern lowlands and the transition
valleys in between. Due to large-scale commercial pro-
duction and processing of oilseeds in the tropical low-
lands, Bolivia is a net-exporter of agricultural commodi-
ties (INE, 2010). Agricultural exports accounted for al-
most 16 percent of the country’s total exports in 2007
and soy/sunflower oil, soy meal and oil extraction cakes
accounted for 62 percent of the overall value of Boli-
vian agricultural exports in the same year (INE, 2009a,
2010).
The turmoil in global agricultural markets during the
2007–2008 food crisis coincided with a number of pro-
found changes in the domestic political landscape of Bo-
livia. A new socialist government (which had the most
support in the highlands and valleys at that time) aimed
at fundamentally reforming the agricultural sector and
the land property laws. In consequence, political con-
flicts between this government and the opposition arose,
adding to already existing strong conflicts on regional
autonomy issues and the distribution of tax revenues
from gas exports. These events were crucial to the agri-
cultural sector since the opposition has its strongholds in
the lowlands in the Eastern part of Bolivia, centre of the
country’s commercial and export-oriented agriculture.
Bolivia represents an interesting case to study the im-
pacts of the strong short-term increase in the levels and
the fluctuations in international food prices of world
markets on the domestic market of a developing coun-
try. At the time the crisis hit, it simultaneously was sub-
ject to profound domestic policy changes and sought to
implement policies aimed at curbing the spread of the
crisis into the country. The objective of this analysis is
to assess whether and to which degree prices of Boli-
vian agricultural products were influenced by interna-
tional price shocks during the 2007–2008 food crisis,
taking into account the implementation of policies di-
rected towards the control of foreign trade. We there-
fore focus on the evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of the
policy measures which have been implemented to avoid
the spread of the crisis to domestic markets. We ap-
proach this question by analysing price dynamics and
interdependencies in time and space, that is, horizontal
price transmission, by using cointegration techniques.
The literature on the 2007–2008 food crisis mainly
focuses on its causes (e.g. Dewbre et al., 2008; Piesse &
Thirtle, 2009), its macro-economic consequences (e.g.
Headey & Fan, 2008; FAO, 2009; Sarris et al., 2010)
and policy options (e.g. Sarris et al., 2010; Timmer,
2010; von Braun, 2008b). Some studies assess whether
and to which degree price shocks induced by the soar-
ing international food prices were transmitted from in-
ternational to national prices. Benson et al. (2008), for
example, use correlation analysis to assess the integra-
tion of Ugandanmarkets for diﬀerent staples with world
markets.
Very little attention has been given to the analysis
of the policy decisions taken by poor countries in re-
sponse to the crisis and the eﬀectiveness of these re-
garding the alleviation or prevention of the crisis’ eﬀects
on prices in domestic food markets. While Meijerink
et al. (2009) provide an extensive account of the actual
policy measures taken in East Africa, Ivanic & Martin
(2008) explicitly address the consequences of the cri-
sis for the poor in developing countries. Cudjoe et al.
(2010) examine the transmission of price signals to re-
gional markets in Ghana before the background of the
2007–2008 food crisis by combining the assessment of
price transmission with a micro-economic welfare anal-
ysis at the household level. Our research, in contrast,
links the results from the analysis of the transmission of
price shocks from the world market to the national mar-
ket of Bolivia with the policy framework implemented
by the Bolivian government in response to this food cri-
sis. Along with this focus, this analysis is one of the
first studies which deals in detail with the institutional
framework of the transmission of price shocks during
the 2007–2008 food crisis in developing countries.
The study proceeds with a description of the events
related to the food price crisis in Bolivia. Focusing on
three key products, namely wheat flour, poultry and sun-
flower oil, a narrative of the policy measures taken in
response to the crisis is constructed. Due to the practi-
cal absence of peer-reviewed literature, this narrative is
mainly based on a review of government sources, news-
paper articles and grey literature.
1.1 Bolivia’s policy responses to raising food prices in
2007-2008
The analysis focuses on three key commodities. The
first commodity considered is wheat flour, which is Bo-
livia’s most important agricultural import product re-
garding the absolute import value (INE, 2010). Wheat
flour and bread are important staples for household con-
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Fig. 1: Nominal and real prices of selected Bolivian food products (in Bolivianos)
Source: SIPREM (2009), FAO (2010), SIMA (2010a,b) and authors’ calculations.
Note: Prices appear on the left ordinates. Prices of wheat flour and poultry are given in Bolivianos per kg and prices of sunflower oil in
Bolivianos per litre. Real prices are deflated to the average 2006 level. Sunflower oil prices are domestic Ex Works prices. Wheat flour prices
are quotes for the wholesale level for imports from Argentina.
sumption (Pe´rez-Cueto et al., 2006) which is also re-
flected by the high weighting factor of 14.8 percent in
the sub-category “foods consumed at home” of the Boli-
vian Consumer Price Index (CPI) consumption basket
(INE, 2009b). Second, the study deals with poultry,
which represents an important product for domestic con-
sumption also for poorer households in urban and peri-
urban zones. Within the sub-category “foods consumed
at home” of the CPI in Bolivia, poultry has a share of
7.5 percent and thereby is considered to be of higher
importance than other staples in Bolivia such as rice and
potatoes (INE, 2009b). Third, sunflower oil as a major
agricultural export product is taken into account in the
study. Although sunflower oil is not the most relevant
vegetable oil for domestic consumption, it is a key prod-
uct of the Bolivian food processing industry for export
(INE, 2010; Zeballos, 2008). In case of other commodi-
ties which are of importance in the Bolivian context ei-
ther no data was available (e.g. rice) or the commodity
was not subject to policy interventions (e.g. potatoes).
From 2007 until 2009, the dynamics of Bolivian food
prices resembled those of prices on international mar-
kets. Figure 1 depicts the development of nominal and
real food prices of the selected agricultural products in
Bolivia during this period, along with the FAO World
Food Price Index on the right ordinate (FAO, 2010).
The price increases started in the middle of 2007. Both
sunflower and wheat prices showed pronounced peaks
during the second half of 2008 and closely resembled
the development of the FAO World Food Price Index,
whereas a similar development cannot be observed for
poultry prices.
Reacting to the increasing food prices, from 2007 on-
wards the Bolivian government implemented a series
of policy interventions for agricultural markets which
were oriented towards trade institutions, consumers and
producers (GIEWS, 2009). A number of objectives for
these measures had been oﬃcially declared by the gov-
ernment. The main goal was to achieve food security
according to the National Development Plan (Supreme
Decree (SD) 29272, ch. 4.2.3). Furthermore, the im-
pacts of La Nin˜a in 2007–2008 were to be mitigated.
Last, the government tried to buﬀer the food price in-
creases of the international market in the domestic mar-
ket in order to protect the most vulnerable households
(SD 29460).
128 C. Schu¨ttel et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 112 - 2 (2011) 125–139
Fig. 2: Product-specific policy interventions during the 2007-2008 food crisis in Bolivia
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on SD 29090, 29182, 29229, 29339, 29460, 29480, 29491, 29524, 29610, 0026, 00144, 00346,
La Razo´n (2007), Salinas (2010).
Note: A Supreme Decree is a legal instrument of the Bolivian executive; only the constitution and laws are superior in the legal
hierarchy (WTO, 2005, 14). Herein, we cite the Supreme Decrees as SD following by its number (they are not mentioned in the
references list). All of them are published in various issues of the Gazeta Nacional del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the most relevant
policy interventions implemented by the Bolivian gov-
ernment for the three above mentioned commodities,
each of which will be elaborated on in detail below.
1.2 Wheat flour
Bolivia is a large net-importer of this commodity, im-
porting more than 70 percent of its national wheat con-
sumption (FAOSTAT, 2011). Wheat flour is the most
important agricultural import product in terms of the
annual import value (INE, 2010). Approximately 95
percent of the oﬃcially documented annual quantity
of wheat and wheat flour imports originates from Ar-
gentina and the remainder from the US (Herbas, 2008).
Policy interventions in the Bolivian wheat flour mar-
ket commenced in April 2007 along with the contem-
poraneously increasing international wheat prices. The
first measure taken was an import tariﬀ exemption for
the basic bread ingredients wheat flour and wheat, yield-
ing a temporary lowering of the tariﬀ rate to zero per-
cent. This measure certainly facilitated further wheat
flour imports from Argentina, summing to the large
amounts of wheat flour which are smuggled from Ar-
gentina to Bolivia anyway (Herbas, 2008).
Additionally, since July 2007, Argentinian wheat
flour has been distributed at subsidised prices to the na-
tional bakery sector by the public company Insumos Bo-
livia, which has importing and marketing of raw mate-
rials and production inputs as among its mandates (Los
Tiempos, 2007, SD 29727). The rationale behind this
input subsidy was to provide cheap bread for consumers
in the larger Bolivian towns. Typically, the subsidised
imports of Argentinian wheat flour were distributed at a
price of about two thirds of the wholesale price (Herbas,
2008). Since late May 2009, wheat flour imported by In-
sumos Bolivia was oﬃcially no longer exclusively des-
tined to the national bakery sector but also made avail-
able to consumers and other food industries (SD 0144).
Although, apart from small quantities of wheat flour
traded with Peru (INE, 2010), almost no wheat was ex-
ported from Bolivia during previous years, exports of
wheat flour and wheat were prohibited from August 15,
2007 on by SD 29229which was renewed several times.
Hence, the ban rather has to be considered as a com-
plementary measure to the governmentally subsidised
wheat flour prices in order to prevent re-exports to Peru.
A further measure was the intervention by the public
“Enterprise for Support in Food Production” (EMAPA),
which was founded in 2007, into the production and
marketing of wheat. This intervention encompassed
the provision of subsidised fertiliser, governmental pur-
chases and milling of wheat, as well as the distribution
of subsidised (domestically produced) wheat flour to fi-
nal consumers (EMAPA, 2008, 2010). The subsidised
national wheat flour has been distributed to consumers
via central sales locations and local retail stores located
in the suburbs of the largest Bolivian towns (EMAPA,
2010).
Hence, the stabilisation of consumer prices could
have occurred via three ways. First and most directly,
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consumers would pay considerably lower prices for
bread prepared from the subsidised flour. The sec-
ond and more indirect way was that parts of the state-
imported wheat flour which had been resold on do-
mestic wholesale markets (as it occurs with other sub-
sidised food products in Bolivia such as milk pow-
der destined to poor households) aﬀected the national
wholesale price level. Third, the availability of sub-
sidised flour was expected to lead to lower demand for
flour imported in the usual way, hence leading to lower
wholesale prices across the country and causing a diver-
gence of the Bolivian prices from international prices.
According to Herbas (2008), however, there is evidence
which shows that in 2007–2008 not the whole amount
of state-imported wheat flour was used in bread produc-
tion. Some of the subsidised wheat flour might have
been re-sold on wholesale markets or even smuggled to
Peru.
1.3 Poultry
In the case of poultry the government employed two
export bans and a tariﬀ exemption during the 2007–2008
food crisis. Regarding the temporary bans on poultry,
implemented from February 27 to March 28, 2008 and
fromMay 27 to June 25, 2008, criticism was raised that,
due to the low amounts of exports relative to national
production (less than 0.5 percent), a ban would not be
eﬀective in addressing the issue of fluctuating poultry
prices on the national market (CAINCO, 2008).
Similarly, a tariﬀ exemption for poultry from Febru-
ary 2008 to February 2009 (Figure 4) did not lead to
increased imports during 2008. Imports of poultry to
Bolivia always had been close to zero during previous
years. In 2009 only, there was first an inflow of about
300 t of poultry to Bolivia which, however, was insignif-
icant compared to the national production volume (INE,
2010).
Therefore, the tariﬀ exemption seems to have been
rather a political sign instead of a policy measure of
profound economic impact. First, its implementation
served to pressure the domestic poultry industry by sig-
nalling that the government would indeed consider aug-
menting domestic supply by facilitating the inflow of
tariﬀ-free foreign meat. Second, the media attention re-
sulting from its implementation seems to have been used
by the government to demonstrate to voters that it was
committed taking political decisions in favour of con-
sumers against rising poultry prices.
In summary, Bolivia’s low national price level of
poultry, as compared to the neighbouring countries, is
mainly determined by a self-suﬃcient supply. In ad-
dition, the absence of refrigerated storage and a weak
transport infrastructure capacity prevent poultry im-
ports.
1.4 Sunflower oil
Sunflower oil represents the oilseed complex which
comprises raw oilseeds, oil meals, oil extraction cakes
and vegetable oils. About one third of Bolivia’s an-
nual vegetable oil production is consumed domestically
which is mainly soy oil (La Razo´n, 2008). Sunflower
oil is almost exclusively destined for export. In 2008,
approximately 78,000 t of sunflower oil were exported
from Bolivia, having an export value of US $ 114 Mio.,
which corresponds to 11.4 percent of the total value of
agricultural exports in that year (INE, 2010).
For sunflower oil, like for all other vegetable oils, a
temporary export ban was implemented between March
19 and April 18, 2008 (SD 29480, see Figure 5). Since
its removal, all exports of vegetable oils are subject to
quotas. The government periodically sets a global quota
depending on the domestic demand and supply situa-
tion. Exporting companies have to apply every four to
six months for an individual share (Riva, 2010). Fur-
thermore, oilseed processing companies have to acquire
so-called suﬃciency certificates, each of them corre-
sponding to an export permission granted to an individ-
ual exporter within the global quota. The permissions
are granted by the authorities only if the national mar-
ket is “suﬃciently supplied at fair prices” (SD 29524,
Article I).
The implementation of the export ban on vegetable
oils, such as soy, sunflower, peanut, palm or cotton seed
oil, between March 19 to April 18, 2008 coincided with
the main oilseed harvest in Bolivia. Although it only
lasted for one month, the first production batches of
soy and sunflower oil were only sold abroad again after
more than 60 days (Salinas, 2008). In the meantime, the
entire production chain of the oilseed industrywas about
to collapse. Oilseed processing companies stopped buy-
ing the raw materials which caused liquidity problems
to producers and slowed down their production in the
face of the insecure resumption of the export activities
(Salinas, 2008; La Razo´n, 2008).
The tariﬀ exemption for imports of vegetable oils had
been proclaimed in the Supreme Decree No. 29460 on
February 27, 2008. Oﬃcial imports of vegetable oils
to Bolivia are very low. For example, they amounted to
only 1,100 t in 2007which corresponded to only 0.4 per-
cent of Bolivia’s exports of vegetable oil. Import quan-
tities even further declined in 2008 and 2009 despite the
exemption (INE, 2010).
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2 Materials and Methods
2.1 Data
The price data of three commodities were obtained
from various sources (Figures 3 to 5). Figure 3 shows
weekly wholesale prices of imported Argentinian wheat
flour of the Bolivian markets of Santa Cruz, La Paz,
Cochabamba and Sucre between January 2007 and
February 2010 (T=164). The US and the Argentinian
free on board (FOB) export prices for wheat grain repre-
sent the international reference prices from the Bolivian
perspective.
Figure 4 depicts the weekly wholesale prices for poul-
try in Cochabamba and Arequipa between 2004 and
2009 (T=312). All of the Bolivian poultry exports origi-
nate from the former city. The wholesale price for poul-
try in Arequipa in Southern Peru is regarded as an inter-
national reference price since it is the main destination
for Bolivian exports. The grey bars in Figure 4 indicate
the two temporary export prohibitions issued for poul-
try by the Bolivian government between February 27 to
March 28, 2008 and May 27 to June 25, 2008, respec-
tively.
Figure 5 shows the monthly Bolivian Ex Works
(EXW) price for bottled refined sunflower oil from
Santa Cruz for 2003 to 2009 (T=84). The world market
price is represented by the FOB price of crude European
sunflower oil shipped to Argentinian seaports. Whole-
sale prices for bottled vegetable oil from Arequipa and
Trujillo (Peru) are further regarded as international ref-
erence prices. The grey bar indicates the Bolivian ex-
port ban for vegetable oil between March 19 and April
18, 2008.
In order to create continuous series for the analy-
sis, data gaps are closed by calculating a random value
based on the adjacent lower and upper observation to the
missing value in the time series. In all cases the number
of missing values was low enough not to aﬀect the esti-
mation results. The price series are converted into US $
by using oﬃcial nominal banking exchange rates from
the central banks of Bolivia/Peru. To facilitate the inter-
pretation of the results, all price series are transformed
taking natural logarithms.
2.2 Unit root and cointegration testing
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to
test for unit roots in the price series. Based on the visual
inspection of the price series, an ADF test with or with-
out time trend is applied. The appropriate lag-length is
selected according to the Hannan-Quinn model selec-
tion criterion (Lu¨tkepohl & Kra¨tzig, 2004). If a price
series is found to possess a unit root, the ADF test is
applied to its first diﬀerences in order to check for the
order of integration of the series. The Johansen trace
cointegration test (Johansen, 1991) is applied to pairs of
unit root price series in order to obtain evidence on the
existence of cointegration relationships which are inter-
preted in the given context as stable long-run equilibria.
2.3 Model specification
If two price series are found to share a long-run equi-
librium, that is, if evidence for cointegration is found,
a vector error-correction model (VECM) is estimated
for the price pair in order to obtain measures on the
long- and short-run dynamics of the price dynamics. A
VECM for a pair of prices takes the form:

∆pAt
∆pBt
 =

αA
αB
 eqt−1 +
k∑
i=1

γAi1 γ
A
i2
γBi1 γ
B
i2


∆pAt−i
∆pBt−i
 +

At
Bt

plt , l ∈ {A, B} denotes the prices in markets A and
B in period t, respectively, and ∆ is the first diﬀer-
ence operator so that ∆plt = p
l
t − plt−1. The term
eq1 = pAt − βBpBt − β0 is the equilibrium error, i.e.,
the amount of disequilibrium, of the previous period.
It quantifies the magnitude and direction of deviation
from the long-run price equilibrium. It is a linear
combination of the two prices which is stationary.
Hence, it does not depart too far from its mean value but
reverts to this value instead. The parameter βB denotes
the long-run price elasticity for the transmission of price
shocks from market B to market A. The coeﬃcients
αA and αB represent the adjustment coeﬃcients. They
quantify the partial influence of the lagged equilibrium
deviation on the prices in the contemporaneous period.
The parameters γli1, γ
l
i2 quantify the short-run dynamics,
that is, the partial influences of past price changes on
current price changes. The lag length k is selected
according to the Hannan-Quinn criterion as suggested
by Lu¨tkepohl & Kra¨tzig (2004). All VECMs are
estimated with a constant restricted to the cointegration
relationships.
Furthermore, a Wald test is implemented to test the
hypothesis of perfect market integration, that is, com-
plete price transmission in the case that βB can be re-
stricted to unity. Granger-causality tests are applied to
further determine the direction of the price transmission
(Rapsomanikis et al., 2003). Last, Chow tests are im-
plemented in order to examine the stability of the model
parameters.
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Fig. 3: Wheat and wheat flour prices (nominal prices, US $ per tonne)
Source: SIMA (2010a), IGC (2010), DIMEAGRO (2010) and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 4: Poultry prices (nominal prices, US $ per kg)
Source: SIMA (2010b), SISAP (2010b) and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 5: Sunflower oil prices (nominal prices, US $ per litre)
Source: SIPREM (2009), ISTA Mielke GmbH (2010), SISAP (2010a)
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3 Results
3.1 Wheat flour
All national price series for wheat flour and the inter-
national reference prices of wheat grain (Figure 3) are
found to possess a unit root at the 5 percent level. Coin-
tegration with the US FOB price was only found for the
La Paz wholesale price. On the other hand, through-
out the period analysed from January 2007 until Febru-
ary 2010, all Bolivian wholesale price series appeared to
be significantly cointegrated with the Argentinian FOB
price at the 5 percent level (Table 1).
Table 1: Johansen Trace test results for wheat flour
Price pairs p-value
Santa Cruz † – US FOB ‡ 0.110
La Paz † – US FOB ‡ 0.025
Cochabamba † – US FOB ‡ 0.060
Sucre † – US FOB ‡ 0.425
Santa Cruz † – Argentina FOB ‡ 0.015
La Paz † – Argentina FOB ‡ 0.001
Cochabamba † – Argentina FOB ‡ < 0.001
Sucre † – Argentina FOB ‡ 0.005
The test was performed with constant and without trend. The
p-values are given for the null hypothesis of no cointegration
vs. the alternative of at least one cointegration relationship.
Lag-lengths are selected according to the Hannan-Quinn
criterion.
Note: † Wholesale price of wheat flour. ‡ Export price of wheat
grain.
The unrestricted price transmission elasticities βB are
all close to unity (Table 2). The results of the Wald
test point to perfect price transmission between the mar-
ket pairs of Argentina and the Bolivian cities of Santa
Cruz, La Paz, Cochabamba and Sucre, since the null-
hypothesis of perfect market integration cannot be re-
jected for these cases.
The unrestricted model (results not shown here) sug-
gests that the wholesale markets for wheat flour with
larger road distance to the Argentinian border were af-
fected more strongly by price shocks at the Argen-
tinian wheat market than those being closer to the border
(larger price transmission elasticity parameters βB). The
restricted model corrects this impression by pointing to
the fact that they responded in the long run by the same
magnitude since all coeﬃcients βB can be restricted to
unity (all p-values larger than 5 percent in Table 2).
For all price pairs, it is always the speed of adjust-
ment coeﬃcient αA of the Bolivian prices which is sig-
nificant. For all cases, the coeﬃcients αB could even be
restricted to zero indicating that the international mar-
kets are weakly exogenous to the Bolivian markets, or
more precisely, they do not show any response to price
disequilibria but it is always the Bolivian prices which
react. Consequently, Bolivian prices follow the interna-
tional reference prices, i.e., international markets appear
to be the price leaders, which is plausible given the rel-
ative sizes of the latter to the former. The values of αA
range between 6.4 and 9.5 percent for the price relation-
ships with Argentinian prices. This means that Bolivian
prices eliminate 6.4 to 9.5 percent of the disequilibrium
of the previous week in the current week, which corre-
sponds to moderate to high magnitudes of adjustment.
Furthermore, for Santa Cruz and La Paz, the Argen-
tinian export price for wheat grain Granger-causes the
Bolivian wholesale price for wheat flour. This under-
scores the influence of the foreign prices on the domes-
tic Bolivian market and hence the price followership of
domestic Bolivian prices. Consequently, price signals
were only transmitted from the international reference
markets to the domestic Bolivian markets and not the
other way around. Bolivian prices closely followed the
international prices. Thus, the policy measures imple-
mented to curb the domestic price increase were not ef-
fective in weakening the link to international prices be-
cause domestic prices still strongly responded to shocks
originating abroad.
3.2 Poultry
Both price series for poultry displayed in Figure 4 are
found to have a unit root and to be cointegrated at the 5
percent level of significance. The VECM yields a long-
run price transmission elasticity equal to 1.205 (Table
3) which can also be restricted to unity at 5 percent.
Consequently, the long-run price transmission between
these two markets can be considered to be perfect. Both
adjustment coeﬃcients are significant at the 1 percent
level (Table 3) which implies that both prices respond
to deviations from the common long-run equilibrium at
moderate rates of 6 to 9 percent. The disequilibrium re-
sponse is much stronger than for wheat since per period
approximately 15 percent of an equilibrium error in total
are corrected by both markets.
Next, we assess whether the export bans had an ef-
fect on the price dynamics. We expect that trade pro-
hibitions of durations of only one month are not likely
to cause permanent structural change in the price rela-
tionship. Structural change in this context would im-
ply that the long-run, the short-run or both relationships
between Cochabamba and Arequipa poultry wholesale
prices diﬀer significantly between the pre-intervention
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Table 2: VECM estimates of the restricted wheat flour models
Market A — Market B αA αB βB β0 p-value § p-value ¶
Granger-
causality
Road distance
(km)
La Paz † – US FOB ‡ –0.044*** 0 1.000 –0.659*** 0.637 0.613
Santa Cruz † – Argentina FOB ‡ –0.094*** 0 1.000 0.678*** 0.452 0.462 A←B*** 561
La Paz † – Argentina FOB ‡ –0.064*** 0 1.000 0.739*** 0.196 0.342 A←B** 907
Cochabamba † – Argentina FOB ‡ –0.064*** 0 1.000 0.743*** 0.126 0.504 905
Sucre † – Argentina FOB ‡ –0.090*** 0 1.000 -0.715*** 0.577 0.374 521
Note: All coeﬃcient estimates are given for the restricted models, that is βB = 1 and the maximum number of exclusion
restrictions on the remaining parameters. The unrestricted estimates of βB are from the top to the bottom 0.914, 1.130, 1.198, 1.248
and 1.102. Significance at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent and *** 1 percent level. Granger-causality results are only given if they
were significant at the 5 percent level. Road distance to the closest Argentinian border town for the actually used trade routes
(LITEBOL, 2004).
† Wholesale price of wheat flour.
‡ Export price of wheat grain.
§ p-value for the Wald test of restricting to unity, that is, for testing for perfect price transmission.
¶ p-value for the maximum number of exclusion restrictions on the adjustment and short-run dynamics parameters.
Table 3: Estimates of the restricted poultry model
Market A — Market B αA αB βB β0 p-value † p-value ‡
Cochabamba – Arequipa -0.088*** 0.062*** 1.000 0.279*** 0.075 0.369
Note: All coeﬃcient estimates are given for the restricted models, that is βB = 1 and the maximum number of exclusion restrictions on
the remaining parameters. The unrestricted estimate of βB is 1.205. Significance at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent and *** 1 percent
level. P-values are given for the Wald test of restricting to unity, i.e., testing for perfect price transmission in the long run.
† p-value for the Wald test of restricting β B to unity, that is, for testing for perfect price transmission.
‡ p-value for the maximum number of exclusion restrictions on the adjustment and short-run dynamics parameters.
and the post-intervention periods. The bootstrapped p-
values of the sample-split Chow test shown in Figure 6
do not fall fall below the dashed line of the 5 percent sig-
nificance level for a longer period. Two punctual drops
occur before and after the implementation of the sec-
ond export ban in June 2008. As Juselius (2008, ch. 9)
emphasises, such a test result does not provide evidence
against the stability of the VECM parameters and thus
does not suggest that the price system was subject to a
structural break.
Figure 6 strongly suggests that the export prohibi-
tions did not impact the price relationships. In addition,
considering the high degree of price transmission deter-
mined between the Peruvian and the Bolivian markets,
it is likely that consumers in Bolivia did not benefit from
the export prohibitions either.
3.3 Sunflower oil
All series depicted in Figure 5 are found to possess
a unit root. Cointegration between the Bolivian prices
represented by ExWorks (EXW) prices fromSanta Cruz
and the four international reference prices was only
found for the Argentinian FOB price. No evidence for
cointegration with European export prices or Peruvian
wholesale prices was found (Table 4).
Table 4: Johansen Trace test results for sunflower oil
Price pairs p-value
Santa Cruz † – Europe FOB ‡ 0.110
Santa Cruz † – Argentina FOB ‡ 0.002
Santa Cruz † – Arequipa § 0.150
Santa Cruz † – Trujillo § 0.282
The tests were performed including a constant. The p-values are
given for the null hypothesis of no vs. the alternative of at least
one cointegration relationship. Lag-lengths are selected
according to the Hannan-Quinn criterion.
Note: † Ex Works price for refined oil. ‡ Price of crude
sunflower oil. § Wholesale price of refined sunflower oil.
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Fig. 6: Sample-split Chow test for poultry
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The Bolivian vegetable oil sector in Santa Cruz
(oilseed processors and producer organisations) focuses
on export prices from Argentina as international refer-
ence prices. The Association of Oilseed and Wheat Pro-
ducers from Santa Cruz uses price data from the trad-
ing exchange in Rosario, Argentina, when communicat-
ing international reference prices to the aﬃliated pro-
ducers in order to support them in the negotiation pro-
cess with the oilseed processing companies (ANAPO,
2009; Carazas, 2009). This explains the highly signif-
icant cointegration of the sunflower oil price in Santa
Cruz and the Argentinian reference price.
The model for the dynamics of the Bolivian and Ar-
gentinian prices yields a long-run price transmission
elasticity β B close to 1 (Table 5). The null hypoth-
esis of perfect price transmission cannot be rejected,
which implies that price shocks on the Argentinian mar-
ket are passed through completely to the domestic Bo-
livian price. The estimated adjustment coeﬃcient αA
implies a moderate reaction to disequilibrium shocks.
The Argentinian price appears to be weakly exogenous
which is plausible since it is much larger than the Bo-
livian market. The Granger-causality test strengthens
the evidence that the direction of the price transmission
is from the Argentinian export market to the Bolivian
domestic market.
Hence, the Argentinian price is the common factor
driving the market pair and price shocks in the Boli-
vianmarket only have transitory eﬀects. The impulse re-
sponse functions in Figure 7 illustrate this point. Shocks
in the Santa Cruz price do not trigger any significant re-
sponse in the Argentinian price (lower panels) while a
shock in the Argentinian price has a permanent eﬀect
on itself and the Bolivian price (upper panels).
Bolivian prices for sunflower oil appear to be strongly
influenced by the dynamics on the international refer-
ence market between 2003 and 2009. Consequently,
price shocks on the Argentinianmarket were fully trans-
mitted to the Bolivian prices during the 2007-2008 food
crisis as well.
As for the poultry price model, the results of a
sample-split Chow test (Figure 8) suggest that the ex-
port ban not did alter the price dynamics and, therefore,
did neither benefit consumers nor cause harm to pro-
ducers and oilseed processors in the long-run. In the
short-run, however, the picture is diﬀerent. Figure 5 re-
veals that the export-prohibition of March/April 2008
did not lead to an immediate decline of the Ex Works
price level for sunflower oil at Santa Cruz, but rather
cut oﬀ a price spike that could be observed in the other
reference markets.
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Table 5: VECM of the restricted sunflower oil model
Market A — Market B αA αB βB β0 p-value † p-value ‡ Granger-causality
Santa Cruz – Argentina FOB –0.110*** 0 1.000 –0.472*** 0.518 0.632 A←B***
Note: All coeﬃcient estimates are given for the restricted models, that is βB = 1 and the maximum number of
exclusion restrictions on the remaining parameters. The unrestricted estimate of βB is 0.949. Significance at the *
10 percent, ** 5 percent and *** 1 percent level.
† p-value for the Wald test of restricting to unity, that is, for testing for perfect price transmission.
‡ p-value for the maximum number of exclusion restrictions on the adjustment and short-run dynamics parameters.
Fig. 7: Impulse response functions for sunflower oil
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The solid lines denote the point estimates of the price response to a one-unit shock in the respec-
tively relevant world market price. The dotted lines denote the upper and lower borders of the 95 percent
confidence interval around the point estimates.
Fig. 8: Sample-split Chow test for sunflower oil
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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4 Discussion
The international 2007-2008 food crisis hit Bolivia
at a time in which a new socialist government was
trying to implement profound agricultural reforms.
Furthermore, the country was aﬀected by domestic
political conflicts between the new government and
political forces opposing the envisaged reforms, and by
the political struggle about regional autonomy issues
and the distribution of tax revenues from gas exports.
Our analysis suggests that the agricultural trade policy
measures taken were little eﬀective in contributing to
food security, particularly in the long-term perspective.
Since the onset of the crisis, wheat flour was imported
on a large scale by the Bolivian government from Ar-
gentina and distributed at preferential prices, first only
to the national bakery sector in the departmental capitals
in order to subsidise the production of bread and later
also directly to consumers and other food industries.
The Bolivian governmental intervention however was
not, or only to a very limited extent, successful. The
results show that throughout the entire period perfect
price transmission between the Argentinian and the
Bolivian wheat markets existed, with Bolivian prices
being determined by the international reference prices.
Thus, the government’s interventions apparently have
failed to shield Bolivian consumers of wheat flour from
the price shocks of the international reference market.
Althoughwe do not have counterfactuals on the inten-
sity of price relationships without the implementedmea-
sures during this period, the results obtained for the ob-
served setting draw a surprisingly clear picture on the ef-
fectiveness of the policies. The estimation results point
to the conclusion that a broad impact on market prices
was not achieved, and it remains an open question to
which degree the subsidised wheat flour, initially only
transferred to the national bakery sector for the elab-
oration of bread, actually benefited consumers. Con-
cerning the aforementioned second and third channels
about how consumer prices could be stabilised through
the interventions (i.e. re-sale of subsidised wheat floor at
Bolivian wholesale markets and subsidised wheat flour
lowering the demand of conventionally imported wheat
flour, thus leading to price decreases), the policies did
not lead to such a price stabilisation. Not only was price
transmission found to be perfect in the long run, Boli-
vian wheat flour prices also appeared to rapidly follow
the world market prices and were even partly Granger-
caused by them. In light of the homogeneous nature of
wheat flour and the clear net import situation of Bolivia
during this period, this may not be surprising. Since the
Bolivian tariﬀs on imports for Argentinian wheat flour
are ad valorem, the tariﬀ exemption did not aﬀect the
price transmission.
In consequence, the policy interventions by the Boli-
vian government appear to have had at best very limited
impacts on the domestic wheat flour market, hence only
benefiting (a part of) the consumers which had direct
access to subsidised bread. Particularly the poor popu-
lation living in rural areas far away from the larger Boli-
vian towns, diﬃcult and costly to be reached, are likely
to not have benefited from these adopted consumer-
oriented policies. This part of the Bolivian population
is particularly dependent on bread prepared from wheat
flour distributed through the wholesale market network
located in the larger Bolivian towns. Thus, against the
pronouncedgoal of promoting food security in the coun-
try, the measures have to be considered little eﬀective. If
the actual (and unstated) objective of the government,
however, has been of political nature, for example to
prevent social unrest in politically relevant urban areas,
the measures might well have met this goal. The ex-
tension of the target group for subsidised wheat flour to
consumers and other food industries in late May 2009
did not alter this situation.
With respect to poultry, the nominal wholesale price
in Cochabamba was far below the Peruvian whole-
sale price level between 2004 and 2009 on average.
Nonetheless, in the face of rising prices, the Bolivian
government implemented temporary export bans and
tariﬀ exemptions. In spite of these measures, our anal-
ysis confirms that price transmission between the two
markets was complete and that price shocks in the Peru-
vian market were fully transmitted to Bolivia. A struc-
tural break test reveals that the two Bolivian export pro-
hibitions in 2008 did not alter the long-run price dynam-
ics between the wholesale prices of the major export and
import markets of Cochabamba and Arequipa. The two
temporary bans for poultry can hence be considered as
rather political measures in order to demonstrate to con-
sumers (and voters) that at least some action against the
raising food price level was taken. Longer lasting export
prohibitions in the future, however, could well lead to
greater distortions and harm the Bolivian-Peruvian trade
in poultry. Accordingly, the measures were criticised by
producers and exporters as threatening an infant market
being developed in Southern Peru and thus counteract-
ing the development of Bolivian agricultural exports and
thus the creation of employment in the Bolivian food
sector. The demonstration of some action against the
rising poultry prices to the consumers may have been of
higher political benefit to the government.
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In the case of sunflower oil, the Bolivian govern-
ment’s reaction to the situation on the world market con-
sisted of a temporary export ban, export quotas and tar-
iﬀ exemptions for imports. In contrast to the strongly
distortive character of these measures, however, the re-
sults of our analysis show that between 2003 and 2009
price shocks of the Argentinian export market were fully
transmitted to Bolivia. The export prohibition did not
change the long-run relationship between Argentina and
Bolivia, but at least cut oﬀ a price spike that was ob-
served in the Argentinian, Peruvian and European refer-
ence markets.
Indeed, only about 30 percent of Bolivia’s vegetable
oil production is consumed domestically. Vegetable oil
could not be exported just at the moment when record
prices would have been achieved from the world market
which caused considerable profit losses to the private
sector, in particular for the agroindustrial and oilseed
processing companies of the Eastern lowlands. The
choice of the export prohibition presented one of the
most distortive measures which could have been taken.
The government’s proclaimed goal of cutting oﬀ price
spikes on the national market for vegetable oils in order
to alleviate price pressure on net-food buyers, temporary
export taxes, for example, could have come to similar
outcomes without creating large profit losses, liquidity
problems and planning insecurity to producers and oil
millers during the harvest campaign. With the measures
chosen, the threat of an increasing perception of trading
partners that Bolivian exports are unreliable could again
harm the development of the sector.
In the short run, such measures might represent an
option which could be partly successful in forcing the
desired price developments on the national market. In
the long run, however, such a policy framework would,
while serving to a better or worse extent the interests
of the poor population, provide strong disincentives for
domestic agricultural production, for increased employ-
ment in the sector and for investment. It thus counter-
acts the government’s goal of decreasing poverty and
food insecurity in the country according to the National
Development Plan.
In spite of the landlocked location of Bolivia and the
implementation of a number of distortive policy mea-
sures during the 2007-2008 food price crisis, robust
econometric evidence is found that Bolivia’s agricul-
tural markets were highly integrated with world markets
during this period. This finding appears to be plausi-
ble since price developments on the domestic markets
of wheat flour, poultry and sunflower oil were strongly
aﬀected by the crisis. This high level of integration with
international markets is both a chance and a challenge
for Bolivia, a country which is both a large net-exporter
of agricultural commodities and a country with many
poor households which are net-food buyers. Creating
adequate conditions which not only promote the liveli-
hoods of the poor, but also the development of the agri-
cultural sector and the food industry in order to encour-
age further agricultural investment, create employment,
boost national food production and reduce food insecu-
rity in the country are viewed as essential.
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